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1.0

INTRODUCTION

In Canada and around the world, there is growing interest in how indigenous law might be
articulated and applied to complex issues1 such as cultural property,2 crime,3 governance,4
women’s rights,5 human rights,6 and resource management and climate change.7 And, there is
much political rhetoric that tends to idealize the pre-colonial relationship between aboriginal
peoples and their environment. Generated by both aboriginal and non-aboriginal groups, much of
this rhetoric contains declarative statements about “stewardship” and “harmony” and “respect”.8
While there are understandable reasons for this trend, such as advancing various aboriginal
claims, it nonetheless creates some theoretical and practical difficulties, as well as many on-theground contradictions for aboriginal peoples who actually trying to research and work with their
legal orders9 and laws.10
However, despite the increasing national and international expectations for indigenous law,
actually discussing the function of law, either in theory or practice, at the local level remains
extraordinarily difficult. For example, several meetings were held in early 2007 with the Alexis
Justice Committee to discuss whether their community justice work with criminal cases might
usefully be considered an expression and form of local law,11 or an adaptation of Nakota legal
order and laws. While the committee members shared many valuable experiences of working
with offenders and the judiciary for over twenty years, they were unable to discuss their work as
having a basis in law. Instead, members talked more generally about responsibility, roles,
kinship, values, gender, and ceremonies and practices. Consequently, insights into the function
and content of local law or Nakota law must be drawn from people’s behaviour and examples of
implicit law that are deeply embedded in contemporary Nakota institutions. It is probable that
talking about laws relating to the environment would be just as difficult for aboriginal
communities.
Aboriginal law does not only exist somewhere in untouched cultures of the past. We contend that
legal principles and obligations of aboriginal law are reflected in the actual work, structures, and
life of present day aboriginal peoples and communities. Furthermore, in every society, legal
norms and law are constantly changing. It is critical, therefore, that research strategies be
designed to prevent creating static or reified constructs of aboriginal legal orders and law. Given
this, we suggest that future research strategies include investigating past and present change
processes, and whether and how aboriginal legal principles may be drawn from present-day
decision-making, conflict, and relationships.
In this paper, we discuss ways to think about and research law concerning peoples’ relationship
with their natural environment that are potentially more useful for non-state aboriginal peoples
with decentralized political structures and authorities. To conclude the paper, we suggest several
long-term strategies that aboriginal peoples might consider to research and implement their law
relating to their land, resources and non-human life forms, and more broadly, their environment.
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2.0

THINKING ABOUT LAW

Given that there is no one aboriginal nation, but rather some fifty-plus diverse aboriginal nations
across Canada, it follows that there is no one aboriginal legal order or set of aboriginal laws. We
propose the development of a flexible conceptual legal framework that can guide culturally and
geographically specific research into aboriginal peoples’ legal orders and laws. Such an
understanding of aboriginal legal orders and law may assist aboriginal groups to;
(1) deal with internal contradictions and manage internal and external conflicts (e.g.,
good tradition as opposed to bad tradition, oppressive traditional practices,
romanticism, and issues arising from “sacred” law12), and
(2) build political relationships with others that are based on history and how people
define themselves (i.e., not on the basis of difference).13
In distinguishing between legal systems and legal orders, we hope to avoid imposing western
legal ideas onto aboriginal societies despite our use of western legal theoretical constructs. Of
course, it is preferable to use aboriginal peoples’ own language when referring to law and legal
concepts. For example, the Gitksan people’s word for law is ayook, which has been translated
into English as law, custom, or precedent. In Western Australia, the Mardudjara have the word
julubidi which has been described as “a body of jural rules and moral evaluations of customary
and socially sanctioned behaviour patterns”.14
It is useful to think about law is as a collaborative process that large groups of people employ to
effectively management themselves. And since many aboriginal peoples in Canada were
decentralized, but definitely had law, the question of where law comes from is raised. One way
to answer this is to say that law may be sourced in the everyday social interaction of people
rather than formal enactments and centralized state machinery.15 In other words, there are at least
two kinds of law: (1) explicit, formal law that is enacted or authoritatively declared and (2)
implicit, informal interactive law (sometimes called customary law). This informal law has been
described as a “language of interaction” that is necessary for people to meaningfully engage in
anticipatory social behaviour. It is this language of interaction that enables the creation of social
settings where people’s behaviours generally fall within predicable patterns and known
repertoires.16
A basic characteristic of law is that it lays down general rules that are open to interpretation.17
These general rules, deriving from group interactions, form a predictable framework within
which group members can manage their lives. For centralized states, this informal interactive
framework actually forms the essential foundation for the successful functioning of formal
enacted law between the law-maker and citizen.18 That is, without interactive law to govern the
relationships among citizens and between the citizenry and the state, the centralized system of
enacted law simply would not be possible.19
To be effective for the purposes of large groups of people managing themselves, such social
interactive law must withstand and adapt to ongoing norm contestation and conflict that are
necessary aspects of every society for every generation.20 In other words, there is no perfect state
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that people can achieve wherein there is no conflict, but rather, conflict is an integral part of how
groups of people work out how to live together.21 In non-state aboriginal societies, these
decentralized institutions and interactive processes result from the continual exercise of
individual and collective agency and collaboration, and will be maintained and adapted as long
as they are deemed legitimate by the group.22
While much of this interactive law is implicit,23 aboriginal societies also made law explicit
through public processes of legal reasoning, interpretation, and application.24 Many peoples
recorded their legal principles, precedents and decisions, and law in their oral histories (e.g.,
Gitksan, Wet’suwet’en), place names (e.g., Tlicho), kinship systems (e.g., Cree, Gitksan), and
traditions (e.g., Tlicho).25
One factor that might contribute to difficulties such as those experienced by the Alexis Justice
Committee members, is that the courts and much of the aboriginal legal and anthropological
scholarship have focused on the “rules” or the “practices” in aboriginal peoples’ law. Little
attention has been paid to the intellectual processes of law that involve legal reasoning and
deliberation, and the interpretation and application of law. From this perspective, it appears as
aboriginal peoples did not and do not think, but merely followed rules or engaged in practices.
Consequently, aboriginal peoples’ law has been called “simple law for simple societies” while
western law became the symbol of civilization.26
In sum, we contend that flexible legal frameworks are necessary to design, implement, and
monitor any research into how indigenous peoples relate to their environment. Such a legal
framework must include thinking about the functions of law, source of law, legitimacy and
authority, norm contestation and conflict management, recording of law, territory (e.g., how far
did the legal order extend?), international law (e.g., what were the protocols for dealing with
other people’s law at the edge of the territory?), how law changes, individual and collective
agency, internal relations of equality and gender (e.g., how are power imbalances and oppression
dealt with?), and the relationship between indigenous law and Canadian law (e.g., political and
legal pluralism).
3.0

THINKING ABOUT NON-STATE LAW

Aboriginal peoples applied law to harvesting fish and game, the access and distribution of
berries, the management of rivers, and to all other aspects of political, economic, and social life.
Arguably, law still functions as law whether it is centralized or decentralized in accordance to the
culture that gives rise to it. So what does law do? A basic characteristic of law is that it lays
down general rules that people interpret and apply. Admittedly, there are is no agreed definition
of law among jurists. However, one legal theorist, Lon Fuller, suggests that there are a minimum
of eight requirements for formally declared law to function effectively:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

There must be established rules or baselines.
People have to know about the rules.
The laws can’t be applied to the past, only to the present or future.
The laws have to be clear.
The laws have to make sense together – they can’t be contradictory.

Indigenous Laws: Some Issues, Considerations and Experiences

3

6. There has to be a consistency of law through time.
7. The actions of the lawmaker and the declared law have to make sense together –
they can’t be at odds with each other.
8. A person can only have a legal obligation that is within his or her power to
fulfill.27
Decentralized aboriginal legal orders fulfill these eight functions of law. The only function that
doesn’t quite fit with some aboriginal decentralized legal orders is item 7, which refers to the
lawmaker and declared law. This is because the lawmaker in decentralized societies is often not
part of a separate institution. But many aboriginal people made law explicit and the law still has
to make sense to people. Examples of decentralized law show that the law-making function is
collective and therefore distributed among many people according to how that society is
organized. And, people in decentralized societies also have to have ways of distributing
information about laws and teaching laws. Decentralized law is more difficult to see because it is
not dealt with in a separate dedicated institution by specialized individuals and the rules that
maintain its framework are implicit rather than explicit.
So what is the process of legal reasoning? According to Gerald Postema, there are six distinctive
features of legal reasoning in the common law:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

It focuses on problem solving.
There is deliberate regard for the larger public good beyond individual interests.
It requires skilled and knowledgeable adjudicators or mediators.
It cannot be turned into technical formulas to be followed by rote without thought.
There is a deliberate and planned reasoning process.
The legal reasoning and decisions are considered common or shared among the
collective.28

These features of legal reasoning were evident in a Gitksan legal process dealing with a crest
dispute.29 In the dispute, the Gitksan chiefs considered Gitksan law, past cases, circumstances,
and histories. The reasoning and interpreting process of the Chiefs was known to the participants
because it was conducted through both formal and informal public gatherings. People with direct
interests and with related interests were involved as well as those who could be considered
neutral mediators. These Gitksan reasoning processes occur within the context of Gitksan
culture, institutions, history, and experiences. In other words, appreciating the wisdom of
Gitksan law “lies in recognition of the internal point of view of participants in the legal
system”.30
Since legal orders and law are entirely created within cultures, it is often difficult to see and
understand other cultures’ laws. However, we can learn how to see law across cultures as long as
we, first, pay attention to our own cultural biases so that we recognize them in our expectations,
responses, and judgments,31 and, second, take the time to understand how the law makes sense in
that other culture.32
Law also originates in social interaction and activities on the land as demonstrated by Gwich’in
berry pickers in the Northwest Territories.33 In this example, Gwich’in women managed the
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harvesting of different types of berries and included (1) access – who can pick berries and where,
(2) sharing information about the location of the berries, and (3) sharing the actual harvested
berries. In this way, Gwich’in women managed conflicts and effectively directed the harvesting
and allocation of an important resource. And since rules by themselves are not law, the variable
factors that the women consider in the interpretation and application of these rules are scarcity or
abundance of berries, kinship relationships, social responsibilities, species of berries, and
environmental factors such as climate change. These guidelines form the basis for Gwich’in
resource law. They originate in people’s interactions and activities over time, are maintained by
continued social interaction on the land, and are recorded in oral histories.
Other aboriginal peoples have similar guidelines to manage land and resources such as rivers,
fish, caribou, and forests.34 The challenge today is to figure out (1) what these guidelines are, (2)
how they are maintained, (3) how they might be changed and adapted to apply today, (4) how
conflicts were and are managed, and (5) how to relate to the laws of external government
(provincial, federal, and other indigenous peoples).35 And, there is the reality of having to
reconcile indigenous laws with centralized contemporary forms of law-making and band
generated laws (e.g., land codes, governance, etc.).
The discussion about resources and land raises three critical questions regarding the territorial
extent of the legal order:
(1) Who is included in the indigenous legal order?
(2) What territory does the legal order extend to?
(3) How does the law relate to other peoples’ law at the farthest reaches of the territory?
For the most part, these questions require aboriginal peoples to go beyond band structures in
order to consider scale, the concepts of the public good and personal interests,36 accountability,
and the full extent of the relationships and responsibilities within the society. The reserve
boundaries created by the Indian Act,37 which divided and grouped aboriginal peoples into
bands, effectively cut across aboriginal legal orders. This division of aboriginal peoples and
lands has undermined the management of aboriginal legal orders and has undermined the
application of aboriginal laws. At the band level, the larger legal order becomes unworkable, and
some co-operative arrangements must be established to enable bands to draw upon broader-based
relationships at a national level to more effectively implement their laws.
In sum, researching aboriginal peoples’ laws about the environment requires, at a minimum,
asking how the law functions for each aboriginal cultural group. The second step requires the
study of informal and formal decision making processes, behaviours and ethics, roles and
responsibilities, and kinship networks. Most often, these opportunities are provided by conflict
(and there are extensive examples within some aboriginal groups), contemporary organizations
and activities (e.g., Alexis Justice Committee), and relationships with other peoples. Finally, this
research design should be informed by an appreciation of the ontology and cosmology of the
peoples. After all, legal institutions, including “rational” western law, are founded on a cultural
understanding of human beings, and life and death.38
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4.0

THINKING ABOUT NATION-STATE LAW

For indigenous peoples world-wide and, indeed, most peoples until the last millennium, the legal
order outlined above operated in a context of avoiding risk. In particular, it meant minimising
risk to food supplies, shelter and warmth, as well as the essence of the group’s legal and social
order. From peoples’ oral histories we know that such a risk-aversion was hard learned from the
dire consequences of salmon, seals or caribou failing to return in sufficient numbers, or of
weather conditions preventing adequate preservation and over-winter storage of meat, fish and
berries. But equally, if not more importantly, maintaining a risk-aversion ethic came and comes
from the high value people put on their future and past generations. Both ancestors and
descendants were and are experienced as part of the present and their wellbeing incorporated into
the day-to-day legal order.
A risk-adverse culture thus sacrifices significant immediate political and economic gains for
long-term stability. As an important part of that stability is living within the bounds of natural
ecosystem resilience, societies in such cultures do not need explicit environmental laws.
In contrast, risk-embracing cultures sacrifice significant long-term stability for immediate
political and economic gains. For example, nation-state cultures emerging out of Europe in the
last millennium have developed such risky initiatives as wide-scale war as a policy instrument
and market or state capitalism as an economic instrument.
In the last century, these instruments have been increasingly employed on a global scale. But in
that expansion, a disjunct has been revealed. The scientific methods and global communications
used to develop them have also combined to show their severe long-term effects. These include
not only nuclear, biological and other strategic weapons, but colonialism, mass dispossession,
and genocide. Similarly, severe effects have been shown from pesticides, air and water pollution,
resource over-harvesting, and high fossil-fuel use. At the same time, grassroots political
movements for world peace, human rights, environmental safety and indigenous rights have
forced governments to at least make a show of accommodating these concerns.
Governments in nation-states have attempted to bridge the disjunct by introducing positivist
laws. These are rules decided upon within a hierarchical structure, adhered to by consent and
backed by more or less coercive enforcement. With these laws, governments say, in effect, the
system works but needs adjusting. Thus, in the face of global war and displacement, they enact
human rights charters and institute refugee agencies. In the face of ecosystem degradation, they
enact environmental laws and institute regulatory agencies. Environmental laws are often of a
command and control type where specified harmful acts are forbidden unless conducted in a
certain way or with the permission of certain officials. While the process of sanctioning
environmental law-breakers is modelled on criminal codes, the scheme is effectively a lop-sided
negotiation between the offending industry and the regulatory agency.
Indigenous peoples included within the boundaries and administrative structures of nation states
have, with greater or lesser amounts of coercion, sometimes adopted state-like institutions. Thus,
the Indian Act has provisions for band councils to enact environmental bylaws39 and the Nisga’a
Final Agreement40 provides for command and control laws for fishery41, forestry42 and other
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resource-use activities. But for the most part, aboriginal people in Canada have attempted to
protect their lands and its natural environment by participating in adversarial administrative or
legal processes. These include inquiries and environmental assessments of large-scale resource
extraction or transportation projects – pipelines,43 roads,44 mines – or aboriginal rights and title
litigation,45 ironically enough often in the context of defending aboriginal hunters and fishers
from environmental regulatory offences.46
As many aboriginal leaders have pointed out, the settlement negotiations following these
adversarial processes rarely involve the people in their own decision-making processes and more
often than not lead to community disruption, distortion and dissent.
5.0

RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Aside from their values and legal orders – both pre- and post-colonial, aboriginal peoples differ
from the rest of Canadians in that they live, or at least grew up in, small communities of interrelated and inter-married persons. Moreover, these communities exist within the framework of
the European-derived administrative structures and legal order of Canada. Research into legal
structures and processes to maintain, restore or enhance environmental and resource values
should thus be at the community level and should focus on:
1. existing, present-day informal and formal decision-making processes and
relationships that already exist within the community, even though these may be
undermined by state laws and seem incapable of effective implementation;
2. being informed by, but not prescribed by, the people’s historic legal order when it
interacted with similar legal orders and not those of the nation-state; and
3. not undermining the culture of either the particular indigenous people or that of the
Canadian state.
Other questions that might be helpful for designing research of an aboriginal group’s legal order
and laws are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What do people recognize and treat as law through their social practices?47
How has their legal order and laws evolved over time?
What are the intellectual and reasoning processes that are necessary to understand
and apply aboriginal law?
What are the internal contradictions that emerge from the research?
How was conflict managed historically? How have these practices changed? What
are the implications of these changes for the group’s internal power dynamics,
relationships, and roles and responsibilities?

5.1
Legal Pluralism
The concept of legal pluralism is useful to begin imagining a non-colonial relation between
aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples in Canada. One definition of legal pluralism is, “the state
of affairs in which a category of social relations is within the fields of operation of two or more
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bodies of legal norms.”48 For legal pluralism to have any practical or theoretical value, it is
critical to avoid essentializing the law of aboriginal peoples or the state.49
According to Sally Engle Merry, the dichotomy between informal, non-state law and formal,
enacted law is false,
[A] concern with legal pluralism moves away from the ideology of legal centralism – the
predisposition to think of all legal ordering as rooted in state law – and suggests attention
to other forms of ordering and their interaction with state law. It highlights competing,
contesting, and sometimes contradictory orders outside state law and their mutually
constitutive relations to state law.50

In Western Australia, Greg McIntyre argues that the common law has the capacity to
accommodate aboriginal customary law, and legislative declarations directing the incorporation
and acknowledgement of aboriginal customary law would be appropriate to facilitate such state
adaptation.51 Such plurality of law could flow from state acknowledgement of aspects of
customary law that, (1) would interface with state law, and (2) are a continuation of some aspects
of aboriginal custom and norms which do not require state recognition or acknowledgement for a
co-existence of law.52
At a practical level, a legal pluralist approach could begin with a river, a caribou herd, a
mountain valley, or other geographic site. What are the laws of the aboriginal group regarding
that place, those resources, non-human life forms, and other humans? What are the various state
laws regarding that same place, those resources, and so on? What is the basis of the laws? How
do each society’s laws make sense to it? How might one build intellectual bridges, founded on a
normative and functioning understanding of law, between the societies? Again, this must be a
rigorous process that does not essentialize the law of either society.
Finally, the work of aboriginal groups developing their own legal pluralist model would benefit
from a dialectical analysis of the relations among the aboriginal group’s normative order and that
of the Canadian state. Such an analysis would provide a “framework for understanding the
dynamics of the imposition of law and of resistance to law, for examining the interactive
relationship between dominant and subordinate groups or classes.”53 Attention to the dialectic of
state relations would ensure that both the internal and external interactions are brought into
focus, and that aboriginal peoples’ agency – historical and contemporary – is emphasized.
5.2
Resource Management Trusts
At the end of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Delgamuukw aboriginal title decision, the Chief
Justice summarised the parties’ task ahead as “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”54 At a practical level, the Court makes
clear that case was about resource use, and that what had to be reconciled was the “special bond”
between aboriginal groups and their lands on the one hand55 and industrial resource development
on the other.56 The Court also said “protection of the environment” was a Crown legislative
objective that could justify infringing aboriginal title.57 Environmental laws, then, were seen to
be on the Crown’s side of the reconciliation equation.
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Here we propose one practical way to reconcile the land governance interests of aboriginal
groups with the land governance interests of Canadian governments and the resource
corporations they licence. Unlike much reconciliation so far in Canada, our proposal attempts to
tackle the task without undermining the legal or economic integrity of either interests’ social
order. In other words, putting into practice the legal pluralism concepts outlined above.
Rationale
In the past and today, governments have used the Indian Act, treaty provisions, economic jointventures, permits, licences and other means to force aboriginal communities into western-style
governance structures. These structures usually have a small group of people at the top of a
hierarchy that runs the show.
It makes more sense, however, for aboriginal communities to organise their governance and land
management institutions under their own laws and social structures. Among the reasons for this
are:
• they accommodate the people’s own culture, which they know best (cultural necessity)
• they maintain consistency between the legal proof and the content of aboriginal rights
and title (legal necessity)
• only they can successfully govern small communities of inter-related and inter-married
people (social necessity)
At the same time, people have to find ways of relating their own governance systems to those of
the federal and provincial governments, their agencies and public and private corporations. Such
relationships include
• treaties (including treaty-related measures, interim measures, consultation and
accommodation),
• local, non-aboriginal communities (including municipalities and regional governments),
• Indian Act relationships (including band councils, tribal councils, etc.), and
• commercial relationships (including joint ventures, partnerships, contracts, etc.).
We propose using the trust as a legal device to form a useful interface between aboriginal
institutions and western governments and corporations.58 First, we briefly describe the concept of
the trust. Then, we look at how the concept might be applied to governance issues with
aboriginal groups.
What is a Trust?
In Anglo-Canadian law, the person who owns something is usually the person who can benefit
from its use (live in a house, collect rent, harvest crops, etc.). The trust, however, separates those
who own something (property or other rights) from those for whose benefit it must be used.
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Generally, a trust is set up when someone who
owns something (the settlor) conveys it to
someone else (the trustee) with instructions (the
trust agreement) about how it is to be managed
for the benefit of others (the beneficiaries).
Trusts may be for individual, identifiable
beneficiaries or for a purpose, which usually
means a charitable purpose that must benefit the
whole community.

SETTLOR
(original holder of an
interest)
conveys interest to

TRUSTEE(S)
(now hold the interest)

for the benefit of

Enforcement through
the courts

A settlor may appoint a single individual as
trustee or a group of joint trustees. They may be
BENEFICIARIES
members of the community that will benefit
or a
CHARITABLE PURPOSE
from the trust or may be from outside of it. In
either case, if the trustee does not fulfil the
settlor’s instructions as contained in the trust deed, the beneficiaries can enforce those
instructions upon the trustee through the Canadian courts.

The trust, particularly the charitable purpose trust, is a useful legal device to help aboriginal
societies interface with western organisations. On the one hand, the trustee (or body of trustees)
presents a single “authority” with which governments and corporations can recognise and deal.
On the other hand, the instructions contained in the trust agreement constrain and inform the
trustees’ actions so that they are accountable to the beneficiaries, which in this case is the
aboriginal community.
A Trust Model
A simple example may serve to illustrate how the trust concept could be used to help resolve
some resource-use and environmental issues currently faced by many aboriginal communities.
Some aboriginal peoples recognise certain groups within the community, such as clans or
families, as the legitimate holders of their land and fishing territories. With such recognition, it
would be inappropriate, if not contrary to their own laws, for a central entity to say what should
happen on any of those territories. At the same time, however, community economic activities,
such as a fishery or a logging operation, need to find ways of dealing with government agencies
and with buyers of their products.
One way of doing this is for each territory-holding group to set up a charitable purpose trust and
provide detailed instructions to its trustees to manage the resources in a sustainable manner for
the purpose of providing spiritual and economic benefit to all current group members and to all
future generations. In this way, the people’s own law would be backed by Anglo-Canadian trust
law.
The need to restore depleted resources, such as logged over forests or depleted fish runs,
however, will likely mean few immediate benefits for some groups within a community. As well,
restoration projects and allocation for a migratory animal such as salmon or caribou requires co-
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operation among groups. It would make sense then for groups of to pool their marketing,
allocation and restoration activities through more centralised entities. Each such entity could,
say, manage a resource-marketing trust for all the territory-holding trust groups. It could provide
management and marketing assistance for such activities as timber harvesting and management,
mushroom harvesting, eco-tourism, medicine plant gathering, trapping, and so on.
The two suggested levels of trust are shown in the diagram below:
COMMUNITY
MARKETING
TRUST

…etc.

Territory
Management
Trusts

Group Members

Note that the arrows in the diagram show the “bottom-up” authority of group
members through their Territory Trusts to the more centralised Marketing Trust.

5.3
Adaptive Management
We suggest that the development of sustainable environmental practices needs to be in the
context of place-based, participatory models. Because many environmental problems are in fact
complex systems problems, they may not be amenable to the simple application of
environmental laws. Alternative approaches, such as adaptive management, have been proposed
to deal with such complexity. The sharing of management power between governments and local
people is necessary to produce flexible, multi-level governance systems in which institutional
arrangements, such as the resource management trusts outlined above, and ecological knowledge
are tested and revised in an ongoing process of trial and error. This is known as adaptive comanagement.59
Adaptive management thus can be seen to have two learning cycles. One is the ethic cycle, in
which the basic values of the community towards its environment are settled. This cycle is not so
much one of change but one of affirmation, drifting away and reaffirmation of the group’s basic
world-view. Many aboriginal oral histories, such as the Nanabush and Raven stories, are of this
type.
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The second is the knowledge cycle
(shown right). This adapts to changing
environmental conditions, such as global
warming, as well as the controlling
group’s ethical evolution. The knowledge
learning cycle involves being faced with
profound uncertainties, taking a
purposeful step forward, monitoring the
consequences of that step, and learning to
avoid future failures from the results.60
The ecological knowledge can be what is
known as traditional ecological
knowledge (TEK), what is known as
scientific knowledge, or both combined.

DESIGN PLAN
STRATEGIES
(to meet plan
goals)

AMEND
STRATEGIES
(to better meet
plan goals)

EVALUATE
MONITORING
RESULTS

IMPLEMENT
STRATEGIES

MONITOR
STRATEGY
EFFECTIVENESS
(in meeting plan
goals)

Adaptive management has been described as a learning process, not by individuals but by a
community, often over several generations. Fikret Berkes suggests that for animals with very
long natural population cycles, such as the George River caribou herd, only aboriginal oral
histories contain the knowledge and the teachings needed to effectively manage hunting pressure
on the herd.61
5.4
Conflict
Cultural ethics regarding authority, legitimacy, and behaviour underlie much of the pervasive
conflict experienced in some aboriginal communities today. For example, the Innu in Labrador
practiced conflict avoidance which worked effectively with small highly mobile groups of people
that were able to travel across a large territory. However, since the establishment of settled
communities, the cultural practice of conflict avoidance no longer works. In fact, when people
are living close together, the practice of conflict avoidance operates to exacerbate the conflict.62
Similarly, the governance structure and authorities of Gitksan people were highly decentralized.
This cultural ethic of decentralization still operates in the form of individual and collective
resistance to hierarchy and centralization.63 For the most part, these cultural ethics remain
implicit and unexamined. Given this, understanding aboriginal legal orders and laws requires
identifying underlying cultural ethics and making them explicit so they can be critically
discussed. Such an analysis requires an exploration of the original purpose of the behaviour and
considering either change or reconciliation of cultural ethics with present day circumstances.
Drawing from her work in South Africa, Celestine Nyamu helpfully provides a three-stage
“critical pragmatic approach”:64
1. Challenge any legal framework or social process that protects cultural, spiritual, or
religious practices from questioning. Create space for diverse voices and challenges
to the norms.
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2. Gather evidence of varied and alternative local practices to counteract negative, static
cultural rhetoric (there are always variations). These could be used to develop new
case law within indigenous law.
3. Identify concepts of fairness and equality within the culture and apply these principles
to issues relating to gender, sexual orientation, ageism, and other imbalances.
To sum up, we have proposed that aboriginal legal orders and law should be understood
practically and critically. It is not about trying to go back in time, but about drawing on the
strengths and principles of the past to deal with modern-day problems and situations.
6.0

CONCLUSION

This paper has set out a broad, theoretical basis to begin critically thinking about how aboriginal
peoples’ relate to their environment through their own legal orders and law. Further, we have
suggested that one way to more effectively structure an “aboriginal environmental law” research
project would be to develop a flexible legal framework within which to begin considering the
function, content, and structure of aboriginal peoples’ legal orders and law. We have given
conceptual and practical examples of legal devices that could assist this exercise of legal
pluralism.
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